We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.
Introduction
This paper studies the interdependence of optimal tax policies and optimal expenditure policies, with a focus on information and incentive problems. An interdependence arises under the assumption that tax revenues are used to pay for a public good. An individual's assessment of a public good will then depend not only on the individual's preferences for public good but also on his earning abilities which determine his income. Hence, the tax policy affects an individual's willingness to communicate his public goods preferences truthfully to "the system". This raises the question what an optimal tax and expenditure policy looks like that takes this interdependence into account. We address this question from two different angles. First, we study optimal tax and expenditure policies from a mechanism design perspective. In this approach, the only constraints that an allocation has to satisfy are physical feasibility and incentive compatibility, i.e., it has to be taken into account that individuals are privately informed about their abilities and their preferences. Second, we study a class of allocation mechanisms that we call democratic mechanisms. These mechanisms take, in addition, two institutional constraints into account: (i) individuals vote over public goods and (ii) all individuals pay taxes. Under a general allocation mechanism individuals communicate their utility functions. Decisions on public good provision can thus reflect the preference intensities of individuals. By contrast, under a voting procedure individuals can only express whether they want a public good to be provided. If so, they vote yes and otherwise they vote no. Hence, under a voting scheme, each person has the same influence on public good provision, irrespective of the person's utility function. A general allocation mechanism makes it possible to separate the individuals who pay taxes from the individuals who decide on public good provision. For instance, it is possible to draw a random sample of individuals who are exempt from the general tax system and whose public goods preferences are elicited via some Clarke-Groves mechanism. The decision on public good provision would then be a function of the characteristics of those individuals who are in the sample. A democratic mechanism excludes this possibility. It is based on the normative premise that the relevant preferences for a decision on public good provision are the preferences of those who pay for the public good via the tax system. We refer to this principle as "no taxation without representation." The assumptions that individuals express their preferences via voting and that all individuals are taxpayers are made in many papers on the political economy of taxation and public good provision. They are empirically motivated. In a democratic society, citizens express political support by means of voting decisions. Moreover, a constitutional principle in a democracy is that citizens with the same characteristics are treated equally. Suppose there are two households who have the same characteristics. In a democracy, it would not be acceptable that one of them decides on public good provision whereas the other household works in order to generate the tax revenues that are needed to pay for the public good. Rather, both households should have the same influence on public good provision and the same duty to contribute to its financing. We introduce these assumptions into an analysis of optimal tax and expenditure policies. The key difference to a positive political economy analysis is that neither the tax system nor the rule according to which votes are translated into expenditures are determined as the equilibrium of a political game. Instead, the tax system and the provision rule for the public good are chosen in order to maximize welfare. Our analysis thus determines the optimal allocation that satisfies a specific political economy constraint, namely, that the preferences of taxpayers are decisive for public good provision and that these preferences are articulated via a voting system. We consider a model with a continuum of individuals who differ in their abilities and either have a high or a low preference for the public good. The public good is financed via an optimal nonlinear income tax. An information problem arises because there is uncertainty about the population share of individuals with a high taste parameter. For this environment, we establish the following results: First, optimal mechanism design makes it possible to achieve an efficient provision of public goods; i.e., the incentive constraints due to private information on public goods preferences do not affect the optimal allocation. To establish this result, we consider a finite random sample of individuals. These individuals face an own incentive scheme that is different from the optimal income tax and ensures that truth-telling of individuals in the sample is a dominant strategy. If we let the sample size go to infinity, the sample provides very accurate information about the distribution of public goods preferences in the economy as a whole and the decision on public good provision is approximately efficient. Second, with a democratic mechanism an efficient provision of public goods can not be approximated. This result is based on the observation that, under an optimal income tax system, an individual's valuation of the public good is an increasing function of the individual's taste for public goods and of the individual's skill level. Highly productive individuals have, ceteris paribus, a larger valuation because they do not suffer as much if taxes are raised to pay for the public good. This dependence of individual valuations on abilities is the driving force behind the failure of efficiency: If many individuals in the economy have a low preference for the public good, this implies that every highskilled individual -even those with a low taste for public goods -has an above average valuation of the public good. Consequently, all high-skilled individuals vote in favor of more public spending. From a welfare perspective, this generates an excessive demand for public goods because a comparison of social costs and benefits would take the high tax burden of low-skilled individuals into account. Analogously, if many individuals have a high valuation of the public good, then all low-skilled individuals have a belowaverage valuation and will thus vote for less public spending. The demand for public goods is then too low because the lower tax burden of high skilled individuals is not given appropriate weight. The consequence of these considerations is that the provision rule for the public good has to be distorted in order to eliminate both the excessive demand for public goods of high-skilled individuals and the deficient demand of low skilled individuals. Finally, we show that the discrepancy between an efficient provision rule and the optimal democratic mechanism is an increasing function of the extent of skill heterogeneity: the distortions of the optimal democratic mechanism become larger as the difference between a high-skilled individual and a low-skilled individual increases. This is our main insight: Under a democratic mechanism, inequality is bad not only for distributive reasons, but also because it is harmful for public good provision.
Our paper also makes a technical contribution. The attempt to link the theory of optimal taxation with the theory of public goods faces a conceptual problem. The theory of optimal income taxation, in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971) , analyzes "large" economies in which every individual takes the tax system and expenditures as given. The theory of public goods, in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) , by contrast, is based on a "small" economy in which every individual can affect how much of a public good is provided. This difference between these environments confronts us with a modeling choice. We could either introduce skill heterogeneity and distributive concerns into a finite economy model, or, we could introduce heterogeneity in public goods preferences and uncertainty about the social benefits of public goods provision into a large economy model of the Mirrleesian type. We have chosen the latter route, for the following reasons. First, we are interested in analyzing a situation where the general tax system is used to cover the cost of public goods provision. Empirically, this assumption seems plausible for public goods that are provided at a national scale such as national defense or the judicial system and which are consumed jointly by millions of individuals. For such a setting, an analysis which assumes that individuals chose their labor supply without taking repercussions for aggregate tax revenues and public expenditures into account seems like a reasonable approximation. Also, for the large economy model, we are able to characterize an optimal mechanism for optimal taxation and public goods provision, which can serve as a benchmark outcome for the study of democratic mechanisms. 1 To deal with the problem of preference elicitation in a large economy, we adopt an idea that has been developed by Green and Laffont (1979) . We consider a continuum of agents but assume that a finite random sample of individuals is drawn for the purpose of preference elicitation. Under a general mechanism, these individuals interact according to some revelation game, whereas under a democratic mechanism, we consider a random sample of tax payers who vote over the public good. To single out the 1 By contrast, the attempt to characterize an optimal mechanism for a finite economy model in which individuals differ in preferences and abilities leads to a more difficult multi-dimensional mechanism design problem whose solution would be an important contribution in itself. The solution of this problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
"reasonable" equilibrium in an economy with a continuum of individuals, we study the properties of these mechanisms as the sample size goes to infinity. Our paper is related to various strands of the literature. It contributes to a recent literature that uses mechanism design methods to characterize optimal tax policies. See, for instance, Golosov et al. (2003) , or Kocherlakota (2005) . A paper that is related to our work is Acemoglu et al. (2007) , who also introduce a political economy constraint into a model of optimal taxation. In particular, they relax the assumption of a benevolent mechanism designer and assume that citizens can use a voting mechanism to control politicians. Bassetto and Phelan (2008) develop a model that is similar to ours, even though their paper differs in focus. They characterize an optimal insurance mechanism for an exchange economy with aggregate uncertainty. The authors focus on the characterization of an optimal insurance mechanism that is robust in the sense that it does not require strong assumptions on individual beliefs nor suffers from multiple equilibria. Our work is related in that we model aggregate uncertainty in a similar way, and also address the problem of robustness. While we use a a sampling approach for the purpose of equilibrium selection, we also focus on implementation in dominant strategies to avoid assumptions about individual beliefs. 2 Our model of taxation is a simple version of an optimal nonlinear income tax system that is due to Weymark (1987 Weymark ( , 1986 . Our work is also related to a literature that analyzes public goods under the assumption that a distortionary tax system is used to cover the costs; see, for example, Atkinson and Stern (1974) , Boadway and Keen (1993) , or Gahvari (2006) . This literature, however, is based on a complete information environment in which the distribution of public goods preferences is common knowledge. Hence, there is no problem of preference elicitation. This latter problem is analyzed in the literature on public good provision under asymmetric information. Recent contributions to this literature include Hellwig (2003) , Norman (2004 ), or Neeman (2004 . In these models, individuals differ only in their tastes for a public good. Neither skill heterogeneity nor a redistributive tax system are involved in the analysis. Moreover, the focus lies on the distortions that arise if participation constraints have to be satisfied. In our paper, individuals do not have veto rights and the state's power to raise taxes in order to finance public goods is taken as given. The idea that a voting rule can be viewed as a mechanism that aggregates information that is dispersed among many individuals goes back to Condorcet (1785) ; see also Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) , Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) or Piketty (1999) . For a model where individuals differ only in their public goods preferences, Ledyard and Palfrey (2002) observe that an optimal provision of public goods can be achieved by means of a voting mechanism if the number of individuals is large. Our analysis shows that this result does no longer hold if we consider an economy where individuals differ also in their productive abilities.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify the model. In Section 3, we consider the problem of public good provision from an optimal mechanism design perspective. Section 4 contains the analysis of democratic mechanisms. The last section concludes.
The Model
The Environment
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals, I := [0, 1]. The preferences of individual i are given by the utility function
where Q denotes the quantity of a non-excludable public good, C is the consumption of private goods or after-tax income, and Y is the individual's contribution to the economy's output or pre-tax income. u is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function. An individual's valuation of the public good depends on a taste parameter θ i that may take two different values,
The disutility of productive effort depends on the skill parameter w i ,
The parameters w i and θ i are both private information of individual i and taken to be the realizations of the stochastically independent random variablesw i andθ i , respectively. The random variables (w i ) i∈I are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) . The probability that an individual has a high skill level is denoted as
The random variables (θ i ) i∈I are also i.i.d.. p denotes the probability that any one individual has a high taste parameter,
In addition, we assume that a law of large numbers (LLN) applies; 5 that is, almost surely, after the realization of randomness at the individual level, the cross-section 3 The assumption that there are only two possible taste parameters is important for the tractability of the model. However, neither the results in Section 3 nor the characterization of democratic mechanisms in Proposition 3 depend on this assumption. 4 The assumption that there are only two possible skill levels is made for ease of exposition. Our main result in Proposition 4 can also be proven if W contains a finite number of possible skill levels or if W is a compact interval. 5 Postulating a LLN for a continuum of i.i.d. random variable may creates a measurability problem.
There are, however, modeling approaches which circumvent this problem; see Judd (1985) or Al-Najjar (2004) .
distribution of characteristics in the economy coincides with the ex ante probability distribution that governs the randomness at the individual level. Accordingly, the probabilities η and p are interpreted as the fractions of individuals with a high earning ability and a high taste parameter, respectively. The LLN also implies that the empirical skill distribution and the empirical taste distribution are independent in the sense that the fraction of high-skilled individuals with a high taste parameter and the fraction of low-skilled individuals with a high taste parameter are both equal to p. We assume that η is common knowledge. Consequently, at the aggregate level, there is no uncertainty about the skill distribution. By contrast, the share of individuals with a high taste parameter p is taken to be a random quantity; i.e., there is uncertainty about the distribution of preferences for the public good. The unknown parameter p is henceforth also referred to as the state of the economy.
Optimal Income Taxation
We assume that the decisions on taxation and public good provision are made sequentially. First, the decision on public good provision is taken. This generates a tax revenue requirement of K(Q), where K is an increasing, continuously differentiable, and convex cost function, satisfying K ′ (0) = 0 and lim x→∞ K ′ (x) = ∞. Given this revenue requirement, taxes are set in order to maximize utilitarian welfare. At this last stage, we assume that the revenue requirement is treated as exogenous. In particular, the tax-setting authorities can not commit to deviate from an ex post optimal tax policy in order to influence the initial decision on public good provision. As will become clear, this sequential structure has a very convenient implication: It leads to an indirect utility function (see Lemma 1) which makes it very transparent how both an individual's taste parameter and skill level affect his valuation of the public good. 6 Moreover, this indirect utility function is single-peaked which is important for the analysis of voting mechanisms in Section 4. The tax-setting authority solves the following optimization problem. Choose a tax function T : Y → T (Y ) in order to maximize utilitarian welfare
subject to the constraints that individual behavior is utility maximizing given the tax function T , for all t ∈ {L, H},
, and the budget constraint,
6 The sequential structure matters only for the analysis of optimal democratic mechanisms in Section 4. Our results on optimal mechanism design in Section 3 do not depend on whether taxes and expenditures are chosen sequentially or simultaneously. In a companion paper, Bierbrauer and Sahm (2008) , we assume that taxes and expenditures are determined simultaneously, and show how this affects the analysis of optimal democratic mechanisms. However, this comes at the cost of a more involved analysis of how individual characteristics translate into preferences over public goods.
The solution to this optimization is well known and we only sketch the derivation. 7
Instead of choosing the function T , the tax setting authority can, without loss of generality, be assumed to choose pre-and after-tax income of individuals directly. 8 Hence, the tax setting authority chooses C L , Y L , C H and Y H in order to maximize
subject to the self-selection constraints,
, and the feasibility constraint
At a solution to this problem, the feasibility constraint is binding. Otherwise, the output requirements of all individuals could be lowered without violating the self-selection constraints. Moreover, the self-selection constraint u(
This is a consequence of the assumption that u is a strictly concave function. A first best utilitarian allocation is such that marginal utilities of consumption are equal, implying that C L = C H . Moreover, the economy's output is produced only by the productive individuals, Y L = 0 and Y H > 0. This outcome violates the self-selection constraint for the productive individuals. They would rather choose the consumption level C L without having to produce any output. Hence, redistribution is limited by a binding self-selection constraint. Using these observations we can solve for Y L and Y H as a function of C L , C H and Q,
These expressions can be substituted into the objective function. Utilitarian welfare is then written as a function of C L and C H , where C L and C H are characterized by the first order conditions,
and
The allocation for the productive individuals is undistorted in the sense that their marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal disutility of effort. By contrast, the allocation of less productive individuals is distorted since their marginal utility of consumption is strictly larger then their disutility of effort. Hence, the optimal income 7 A rigorous solution can be found in Hellwig (2007) . The special case of preferences that are quasilinear in leisure is treated by Weymark (1986 Weymark ( , 1987 . 8 This observation is known as the taxation principle. See, for instance, Guesnerie (1995) .
tax implies a downward distortion in the labor supply of low-skilled individuals. The first order conditions imply that the after-tax incomes of high-and low-skilled individuals do not depend on public good provision. By contrast, an increase in the revenue requirement K(Q) by ∆ implies that the pre-tax incomes also increase by ∆. Taking these implications of optimal income taxation into account, individual utilities can be represented in a reduced form.
Lemma 1 Optimal income taxation, given a level Q of the public good, implies that the utility U (Q, θ, w) of an individual with characteristics θ ∈ Θ and w ∈ W equals
where
and C L and C H are given by the first order conditions in (2).
The optimal decision on public good provision
Prior to income taxation, the decision on public good provision has to be taken. For a given p, an optimal choice of Q maximizes
The optimal level of public good provision, Q * (p), is characterized by the first order condition
This optimality condition is a modified version of the Samuelson Rule that takes into account that a distortionary income tax system is used to cover the cost of public good provision. The marginal social cost of public good provision, λK ′ (Q * (p)), has to be equal to the marginal social benefit, pθ
The problem of information aggregation
The function Q * : p → Q * (p) specifies the optimal quantity of the public good as a function of p, i.e., as a function of the cross-section distribution of public goods preferences. If a benevolent planner wants to provide public goods according to this provision rule, she needs to acquire information on the actual value of p. However, individuals have private information about their public goods preferences. This raises the question whether information on p can indeed be obtained if individuals know that the planner seeks to implement provision rule Q * .
To motivate this problem, suppose that public goods are provided according to Q * . An individual's utility can then be written as a function of p,
With a slight abuse of notation, we drop the term φ(w) because it does not depend on Q and is hence irrelevant for the problem of preference elicitation. It is easily verified that
is a measure of the marginal social benefit from public good provision that takes the marginal cost of public funds, λ, into account. Analogously, θw is a measure of an individual's valuation of the public good that takes into account that public good provision affects the output requirements Y L and Y H . An individual is better off if p is larger -or, equivalently, if more of the public good is provided -if and only if her valuation, θw, exceeds the utilitarian valuation, v(p). Likewise, an individual with a below average valuation prefers to have a lower quantity of the public good. Thus, individuals care about the planner's perception of p. Generally, individuals who pay taxes will not communicate their preferences truthfully if they can influence the planner's decision. Consider an individual with a low taste parameter and a high skill level. Moreover, for the sake of the argument, assume that this individual believes p to be very low. 9 If a vast majority of individuals has a low taste parameter, then this individual can be sure that his own valuation lies above the average, θ L w H > v(p). Put differently, the individual expects that the quantity of the public good is too low. Hence, this individual is inclined to announce a high taste parameter. We discuss two different approaches to the problem of information aggregation. In Section 3 we discuss the problem from a mechanism design perspective and show that there is a mechanism that allows to achieve the modified Samuelson Rule. In Section 4 we study a "democratic" environment where tax payers vote over the level of public good provision. In this setting, the modified Samuelson Rule can be no longer reached and we characterize the optimal "democratic" provision rule.
Optimal Mechanism Design
In this section, we characterize provision rules that are achievable if individuals are privately informed about their public goods preferences and their skills; that is, we focus on incentive compatibility constraints. The main result is that there is a mechanism that makes it possible to provide public goods according to the modified Samuelson Rule, Q * . However, this requires that the individuals who provide the information on the distribution of preferences are separated from the set of individuals who cover the cost of public good provision via their income tax payments.
Equilibrium Selection via Sampling
Mechanism design in a continuum economy leads to a severe problem of equilibrium multiplicity. Suppose that public good provision is based on a direct mechanism, i.e., individuals announce their taste parameters and their skills to a mechanism designer. Further, assume that the mechanism designer's decision on public good provision is a function of the measure of individuals who announce a high taste parameter. With such a mechanism, any individual is willing to reveal the own taste parameter because, in a continuum economy, a single individual's announcement does not affect the measure of individuals who announce a high taste parameter. This leads to the trivial conclusion that Q * is an implementable provision rule because no individual has an impact on public good provision and hence no individual minds revealing her characteristics to the mechanism designer. However, by the same reasoning, any behavior could be rationalized. For instance, individuals with a low taste parameter and high skills might announce a high taste parameter, because they expect that the mechanism designer will choose a provision level that is too low. More generally, whatever an individual announces, the announcement is a best response because it is inconsequential in a continuum economy.
To deal with this problem of equilibrium multiplicity, we study mechanisms that rely on sampling; that is, a random sample of N individuals is asked to communicate their characteristics to the mechanism designer. Based on the messages of sample members, the mechanism designer decides on public good provision. Finally, individuals who have not been in the sample choose their labor supply subject to an optimal income tax. We study the properties of these sample mechanisms as N → ∞ and an individual's impact on public good provision vanishes. We invoke the Revelation Principle and limit attention to incentive-compatible, direct mechanisms. Denote the set of sampled individuals by
is an output requirement for sample member i if the profile of announcements to the mechanism is given by (
is individual i's consumption as a function of the sample member's announcements. These output requirements and consumption levels are specific to the set of sampled individuals. Finally, Q N ((θ i ,ŵ i ) i∈S N ) is the decision on public good provision. A direct mechanism is incentive-compatible, if truth-telling is a dominant strategy: 10 for all i ∈ S N , for all (θ j ,ŵ j ) j =i ∈ (Θ × W ) N −1 and for all (θ i , w i ) ∈ Θ × W ,
The mechanism designer has the possibility to distinguish between individuals who are in the sample and individuals who are not. The latter pay for the public good via the income tax system. The tax revenues generated from the countable set of individuals in the sample have no weight at an aggregate level. The output requirements {t i N } i∈S N and the consumption levels {C i N } i∈S N are used only to ensure incentive compatibility for individuals in the sample.
Efficient Provision Rules for Sample Mechanisms
The state of the economy p is a random quantity. For simplicity, we impose the following assumption on the prior beliefs of the mechanism designer. 11
Assumption 1 The mechanism designer takes p to be the realization of a random variable which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] .
10 We focus on dominant strategies because this implies that the equilibrium of the mechanism is robust with respect to assumptions about the beliefs of individuals concerning the random variable p and the characteristics of individuals in the sample.
11 Throughout we do not need to impose a common prior assumption. We only specify the prior beliefs of the mechanism designer.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let m := #{i ∈ S N | θ i = θ H }. Q N is an efficient provision rule for a sample mechanism if and only if, for every (
A mechanism designer has posterior beliefs on p that depend on the number m of individuals in the sample with a high taste parameter. Given these posterior beliefs, the mechanism designer's valuation of the public good is given by
In particular, this valuation is an increasing function of the number m of individuals with a high taste parameter.
Proposition 1 For N sufficiently large, an efficient provision rule is incentive-compatible only if output requirements and consumption levels of individuals in the sample are different from those that these individuals would choose under the income tax system.
A proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix. According to Proposition 1, if the incentives of individuals are shaped only by the income tax, then an efficient use of the information that they provide is not possible. Efficiency can be achieved only via an adjustment of output requirements and consumption levels. Under an optimal income tax public goods preferences depend on taste parameters and skills. This interaction of taste and skill parameters implies that an income tax does not provide appropriate incentives for a revelation of public goods preferences. To illustrate this, suppose that the possible valuations of the public good are ordered as follows,
Efficiency requires that if an individual announces a high taste parameter, then more of the public good is provided. Incentive compatibility requires that this outcome makes an individual with a high taste parameter better off. However, if θ L w H > θ H w L and an announcement of θ H is beneficial for a low skilled individual with a high taste parameter, then it is also beneficial for a high-skilled individual with a low taste parameter; i.e., if incentive compatibility is ensured for all individuals with a high taste parameter, this implies that incentive compatibility is violated for some individuals with a low taste parameter.
The following mechanism is incentive-compatible and achieves an efficient use of information. Individuals in the sample have to produce a fixed amount of outputȲ that is independent of their announcements. 12 The mechanism designer chooses consumption levels {C L (m)} N −1 m=0 and {C H (m)} N m=1 such that, if there are m individuals with a high taste parameter in the sample, then every individual with a low taste parameter consumes C L (m) and every individual with a high taste parameter consumes C H (m), irrespective of the announced skill levels. A truthful announcement of taste parameters is a dominant strategy if, for every m ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1},
For instance, truth-telling is a (strictly) best response for each individual in the sample if, for every m, C L (m) and C H (m + 1) are chosen such that
These considerations show that, for any given N , there exists an incentive compatible mechanism that achieves an efficient use of the information that the sample members provide. The following Proposition asserts that for N → ∞ the expected welfare level that is generated by such a mechanism converges to the level of expected welfare that is induced by the Samuelson rule under conditions of complete information on the distribution of preferences. A proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 For every N , there exists an incentive compatible mechanism that achieves an efficient use of information. Let EW * N be the induced expected welfare level. Then
is the expected welfare level induced by Q * .
To sum up, under an income tax system, an individual's contribution to a public good is a function of the individual's income. Moreover, an individual's behavior on the labor market depends only on the individual's skills but not on the public goods preferences. Proposition 1 shows that this implies that individuals whose incentives are shaped by the tax system will not reveal their taste parameters. By contrast, a mechanism where a subset of individuals is taken away from the labor market and faces an alternative incentive scheme makes it possible to acquire information on public goods preferences in an efficient way. As Proposition 2 shows, this implies that public goods can be provided as if there was complete information on the distribution of public goods preferences.
Democratic Mechanisms
In this section we study democratic mechanisms for income taxation and public good provision. A democratic mechanism is defined by two principles. The first principle is that individuals vote over public goods. Formally, individuals have an action set with two elements yes and no. The decision on public good provision is a function of the number of individuals who vote yes. If the public good comes as an indivisible unit, Q ∈ {0, 1}, then the public good is provided if the number of yes votes exceeds some threshold. Our approach is more general in that we consider a public good that can be provided in any quantity. The decision on public good provision is then an increasing function of the number of individuals who vote yes; i.e. if more voters support public good provision then a larger quantity of the public good is provided. Conceptually, the difference between a direct mechanism and a voting mechanism is that the former asks individuals for their utility functions. A voting mechanism is ignorant about utility functions, each person -as opposed to each utility function -is given equal consideration for the decision on public good provision. Our formalization of a voting mechanism has been inspired by the Downes (1957) model of two-party competition. In this model, there are two competing parties. Each party proposes a public goods provision level and the winning party's proposal is finally implemented. Our approach is similar in that (i) we also assume that, a priori, a public good may be provided in any quantity, Q ∈ R + , (ii) the decision which quantity is implemented is based on a game in which voters have two actions (party A versus party B in the Downsian model; more versus less public goods provision in our model) and which (iii) has an equilibrium in strategies that are weakly dominant. 13 The key difference between the Downsian model and our approach, of course, is that we do not use political competition to close our model. Instead, given the voting procedure of the Downsian model, we ask what is the best allocation of public goods that one can get. This approach makes it possible to separate the inefficiencies that are due to the use of a voting mechanism from those that are due to political competition. The second principle is "no taxation without representation". We study the implications of the postulate that a decision on public good provision should reflect the preferences of those individuals who pay taxes. We thus assume that the individuals who decide on public good provision face the same tax system as any other individual in the economy. Formally, the utility function of a voter with characteristics (θ, w) is given by
that is, by the utility function that is implied by an optimal income tax system.
Implementation by a voting mechanism
We consider a random sample of N individuals who decide on public good provision via a voting procedure. We will let the sample size go to infinity to single out the "reasonable" equilibrium in the continuum economy. As in the previous section on optimal mechanism design, a provision rule is a function Q N : (Θ × W ) N → R + that specifies how much of the public good is provided as a function of the characteristics of individuals in the sample. In the following we will first formalize the notion that such a provision rule is implementable by a voting mechanism. We will then give a complete characterization of the provision rule with this property. A voting mechanism is a game where individuals have an action set consisting of the elements yes and no. The outcome of the voting game is a non-decreasing function Q V N : {0, . . . , N } → R + that specifies a decision on public good provision as a function of the number m y of individuals who vote yes. A strategy σ : Θ × W → {yes, no} for the game induced by the voting mechanism specifies an individual's vote σ(θ i , w i ) as a function of the individual's taste parameter and skill level. σ is a dominant strategy if, σ(θ, w) = no implies that
, θ, w) , for every m y , and σ(θ, w) = yes implies that
, θ, w) , for every m y . A provision rule Q N : (Θ × W ) N → R + is said to be implementable by a voting mechanism if there is a voting mechanism Q V N : {0, . . . , N } → R + with an equilibrium σ such that, for every (θ i , w i ) i∈S N ,
is the number of yes-votes induced by σ if the characteristics of individuals in the sample are given by (θ i , w i ) i∈S N .
Proposition 3 Provision rule Q N is implementable by a voting mechanism if and only if there is a subset X of the set of types Θ × W such that the following properties hold: i) Whenever (θ, w) belongs to X and (θ ′ , w ′ ) does not belong to X then θw ≥ θ ′ w ′ .
ii) Whenever two samples S N and S ′ N are such that #{i
. With some abuse of notation we write Q N (m X ) instead of Q N ((θ i , w i ) i∈S N ), where
iii) For all m X ∈ {0, . . . , N }, (θ, w) ∈ X implies that
and (θ, w) ∈ −X implies that
Proposition 3 gives a complete characterization of the provision rules that can be decentralized via a voting mechanism. It is based on a binary partition of the set of types. The set X contains the individuals who benefit if more of a public good is provided and hence vote yes. The complement −X contains the individuals who are harmed if more of the public good is provided and vote no. The proof is in the Appendix. It is based on the observation that any dominant strategy equilibrium of a voting game partitions the set of types Θ × W into those who vote yes, X, and those who vote no, −X. Consequently, a decision that reflects the number of individuals who vote yes is equivalent to a decision that reflects the number of individuals with types in X.
The main result
We use the following approach to characterize the optimal voting mechanism. For each subset X of the set of types Θ × W that satisfies property i) in Proposition 3, we solve for the provision rule Q N : m X → Q N (m X ) that maximizes
where ρ(m X ) is the probability that the number of sample members with characteristics in X equals m X , subject to the equilibrium conditions in (3) and (4). We denote the optimal provision rule by Q * * N,X and the corresponding level of welfare by EW * * N,X . We then let N → ∞ and compute lim N →∞ EW * * N,X . Finally we compare the optima that correspond to different values of X to determine the optimal partition, X * , and thereby the optimal voting mechanism.
Proposition 4
i) The optimal democratic mechanism cannot approximate an efficient decision on public good provision. Formally, lim N →∞ EW * * N,X * < EW * .
ii) The discrepancy between the optimal democratic mechanism and an efficient mechanism vanishes as the heterogeneity in abilities vanishes: lim N →∞ EW * * N,X * converges to EW * as w H converges to w L .
Theorem 4 follows from Lemmas 3-5 that are discussed in section 4.3. The main statement is that, under a democratic mechanism, heterogeneity in skills is harmful for public good provision.
To give an intuition, suppose that all individuals have the same skill level. This implies that all individuals with a high taste parameter have an above average valuation of the public good and all individuals with a low taste parameter have a below average valuation of the public good. If public goods are provided according to the Samuelson Rule, then individuals with a high taste parameter vote yes to maximize the level of public good provision. Likewise, individuals with a low taste parameter vote no. As a consequence, the population share of individuals who vote yes is equal to the population share of individuals with a high taste parameter p. Hence, a voting mechanism can achieve public good provision according to the Samuelson Rule. This reasoning breaks down if there is skill heterogeneity. If an individual with skill level w L and taste parameter θ H votes yes, then an individual with skill level w H and taste parameter θ L will also vote yes since the valuation of the public good by the latter, w H θ L , is close to or even exceeds w L θ H . As a consequence, the provision rule for the public good has to be distorted to ensure that the distribution of votes is informative about the state of the economy. These distortions do not disappear as N goes to infinity.
Proof of Proposition 4
Without loss of generality, we limit attention to voting mechanisms where the set X of individuals who vote yes belongs to
To see that these are the only cases of interest, consider the partitions of the set of types into a "yes"-set and a "no"-set that are not included in X. Suppose first that θ L w H ≤ θ H w L . In this case the only alternatives are voting mechanisms where all individuals vote no or all individuals vote yes. Clearly, such a voting mechanism does not generate any information about the distribution of public goods preferences. Now assume that θ L w H > θ H w L . In this case, a voting mechanism where individuals with types in {(θ H , w L ), (θ H , w H )} vote yes is not admissible because it violates property i) of Proposition 3. A voting mechanism where all individuals with types in {(θ L , w H ), (θ H , w H )} vote yes would be admissible. However, such a voting mechanism generates information about the number of high-skilled individuals in the sample. Given the assumption that, for every p, skill levels and taste parameters of individuals are independent random variables, this does not generate any information about public goods preferences. By contrast, the partitions which belong to X generate accurate information about p as N goes out of bounds. Intuitively, suppose that X = {(θ H , w H )}. As N becomes large the number of yes votes converges in probability to η p. Knowing this, the mechanism designer, can infer the distribution of public goods preferences, p, from the number of individuals with a taste parameter and a high skill level, provided that the sample is sufficiently large.
This intuition is formally confirmed by Lemma 3. Before we state this Lemma, we introduce some notation.
Definition 1 For any given X ∈ X denote by Q * * X the maximizer and by EW * * X the maximal value of
where Q : [0, 1] → R + has to be chosen such that, for every pair p and p ′ with p ′ > p, (θ, w) ∈ X implies that
Lemma 3 For any given X ∈ X, lim N →∞ EW * * N,X = EW * * X .
A formal proof of Lemma 3 can be found in the Appendix. According to the Lemma, as the sample size goes to infinity, the mechanism designer chooses a provision rule Q → Q(p) that specifies a decision on public good provision for each state p of the economy. To ensure that this provision rule can be decentralized by a voting mechanism it must be true that all individuals with characteristics in X prefer a large provision level Q(p ′ ) over a small provision level Q(p). All other individuals prefer the small provision level over the large provision level.
Lemmas 4 and 3 imply that statement i) of Proposition 4 is true. We omit a formal proof of Lemma 4 and only sketch the main arguments. Suppose first that w H is sufficiently close to w L , so that we have an order of provision levels that is illustrated by the following line,
where Q * (0) and Q * (1) are the minimal and the maximal element, respectively, of the image of the modified Samuelson Rule, Q * , and Q jk is the maximizer of U (Q, θ j , w k ) for j, k ∈ {L, H}.
Consider a voting mechanism where all individuals with a high taste parameter vote yes. Consequently, for any pair Q(p ′ ) and Q(p) with p ′ > p it must be true that
This implies that there is at most one p such that Q(p) ∈ [Q HL , Q * (1)]. Suppose to the contrary that there are Q(p) and Q(p ′ ) with
Hence, a contradiction. By the same logic, there is at most one p such that
Since the image of Q * contains the intervals [Q * (0), Q LH ] and [Q HL , Q * (1)], this implies that EW * cannot be approximated by a voting mechanism where all individuals with a high taste parameter vote yes. The same is true for any alternative voting mechanism. Consider for instance, a voting mechanism where individuals with characteristics in {(θ L , w H ), (θ H , w L ), (θ H , w H )} vote yes. Under such a voting mechanism there can be at most one p such that
Lemma 5 max X∈X EW * * X converges to EW * as w H converges to w L .
Lemmas 5 and 3 imply that statement ii) of Proposition 4 is true. Again, we only sketch the proof. It follows from the observation that Q LH converges to Q LL and Q HL converges to Q HH as w H converges to w L . Hence, under a voting mechanism where all individuals with a high taste parameter vote yes the distorted intervals [Q * (0), Q LH ] and [Q HL , Q * (1)] get smaller and smaller. In the limit, the modified Samuelson Rule Q * is achievable.
Comparative Statics of Optimal Democratic Mechanisms
We now turn to a characterization of the optimal democratic mechanism. We are particularly interested in the question how the extent of skill heterogeneity affects public good provision under an optimal democratic mechanism. The analysis proceeds as follows. For each given X ∈ X we characterize the solution to the optimization problem in Definition 1. 14 . For given parameters of the model, this gives a list of candidate solutions that can be used to single out the optimal provision rule and to obtain comparative statics results. While in principle, the comparative statics analysis could be carried out analytically, we illustrate the main insights using a numerical example, in order to avoid lengthy algebraic manipulations. In particular, we assume that w H = 1 + x and that w L = 1 − x, so that x ∈ [0, 1] is our measure of skill heterogeneity. 15 Our main findings are the following: i) Expected welfare is, by and large, a decreasing function of x. However, locally, expected welfare may be increasing in x.
ii) The optimal provision rule for public goods responds less to changes in the distribution of public goods preferences as x increases.
iii) Under an optimal democratic mechanism, the set of types X who are in favor of increased public spending depends on x.
These findings are robust across alternative model specifications and could also be established analytically. 16 In the following we illustrate them by means of our numerical example.
If w H is sufficiently close to w L , then the optimal provision rule is such that all individuals with a high taste parameter vote for more public spending, i.e., X = {(θ H , w L ), (θ H , w H )}. Moreover, for x close to zero, the optimal provision rule for the public good has four bunching regions and an increasing region for medium levels of p, as in Figure 2 below. It is necessary to deviate from Q * for low values of p, because otherwise high-skilled individuals with a low taste parameter vote yes, and for high values of p, because otherwise low-skilled individuals with a high taste parameter vote no. Formally, for p small, the constraint 
This implies that for high levels of p, there is only a choice between the provision levels Q l and Q ll . Under an optimal provision rule, Q s and Q l get closer to each other as x increases and θ L w H approaches θ H w L . A provision rule with three bunching regions arises as the limit case in which the range over which the provision rule is continuously increasing shrinks to a single point, see Figure 3 . Figure 3 . The figure depicts a provision rule with three bunching regions.
As x increases the provision levels Q s , Q m and Q l converge to each other. In the limit there would be a provision rule with only one bunching region, i.e., a provision rule that does not use any information on the state p of the economy. As a consequence, a voting mechanism where all individuals with a high taste parameter vote yes, X = {(θ H , w l ), (θ H , w H )}, is not optimal for x sufficiently large. It becomes superior to use a voting mechanism where only individuals with a high taste parameter and a high skill level are in favor of more public spending, X = {(θ H , w H )}. To illustrate why this is true, consider the scenario in the following figure, Compared to a voting mechanism with X = {(θ H , w L ), (θ H , w H )}, a mechanism with X = {(θ H , w H )} has the weakness that there can be only one provision level smaller than Q HL , but the strength that the whole interval [Q HL , Q * (1)] can be used. This advantage is the dominating effect if Q HL is small and the interval [Q HL , Q * (1)] is large. In this case the optimal provision rule has the shape that is illustrated by Figure  5 . This type of provision rule becomes more attractive if x gets larger x and Q HL gets smaller. Consequently, over an intermediate range, EW * * X * is an increasing function of x. Figure 5 . The figure depicts a provision rule with two bunching regions. For large p the provision rule is strictly increasing and coincides with the modified Samuelson Rule, Q * .
We eventually reach the point where θ L w H = θ H w L , and hence Q LH = Q HL . The optimal voting mechanism is still such that X = {(θ H , w H )}, but now it faces the constraint that there can be only one provision level smaller than Q LH . Again, the shape of the optimal provision rule is as in Figure 5 . However, for x and Q LH sufficiently large, the range over which the optimal provision coincides with Q * shrinks to a singleton. In the limit case x → 1, it yields the same level of welfare as the optimal uninformed provision rule, i.e., the optimal provision rule that requires to choose the same provision level for all p.
The following graph plots the fraction of the surplus
that is realized under an optimal democratic mechanism. EW u denotes the the maximal level of welfare that can be achieved by choosing the same provision level for every p. Hence, EW * − EW u is the utility gain from an efficient decision on public good provision and F S is the fraction of this utility gain that is realized under an optimal democratic mechanism. The graph shows that F S converges to 1 as x converges to 0 and converges to 0 as x converges to 1. Put differently, if there is no heterogeneity in skills then efficiency is possible under a democratic mechanism. If skill heterogeneity is large, then a democratic mechanism cannot use any information on the distribution of public goods preferences.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied democratic mechanisms that are defined by the property that a population of tax payers is voting over public goods. It has been shown that these mechanisms perform worse than mechanisms that make use of the possibility to separate the individuals who decide on public good provision from the population of tax payers. By contrast, if all individuals have to pay taxes, then there is an interaction between the tax system and the problem of preference elicitation which implies that inequality is problematic for public good provision. In this sense, our paper provides a critique of democratic mechanisms. However, if viewed from a different angle, democratic mechanisms are not too bad. Our analysis shows that they are strictly better than "myopic" mechanisms that would be based on the following reasoning: Suppose we take it as given that individuals pay taxes and that the taxes they pay depend on a lot of characteristics such as their abilities. However, the problem at hand is to elicit public goods preferences. So we design a mechanism such that individuals communicate their preferences truthfully and remain ignorant about all the other characteristics. We just make sure that truth-telling is a best response whatever these characteristics are.
In our model we would formalize this as a mechanism where individuals announce a taste parameter and we would require that truth-telling is optimal for every possible skill level. Such a myopic mechanism is equivalent to a voting mechanism where all individuals with high taste parameter are in favor of increased public spending. As our analysis has shown it is in general possible to improve on such a mechanism. For instance, the optimum can be such that only individuals with a high taste parameter and a high skill level vote for more public goods. We think that, for many applications of mechanism design, a myopic interpretation is not too implausible. The typical textbook treatment is a partial equilibrium analysis where individuals have utility functions that are linear in money. This approach focusses on one particular aspect of heterogeneity and abstracts from all other characteristics that individuals have. If we take this myopic approach as a benchmark, then democratic mechanisms appear quite attractive.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
Step 1. We first derive the posterior beliefs of the mechanism designer. Given the assumption that individual taste parameters and skill levels are stochastically independent, it is without loss of generality to assume that the mechanism designer's posterior beliefs are a function of the number ν of agents with a high taste parameter in a sample of size N . The mechanism designer's prior beliefs are given by the density function φ. Under Assumption 1, φ(p) = 1, for all p ∈ [0, 1]. From an ex ante perspective, ν is a random variable, with 17
This is intuitive, with p uniformly distributed, all possible realizations of ν are equally likely. Now suppose that ν = m and consider the conditional density φ thereby induced over p. By Bayes' rule
17 The following relation is used repeatedly:
Step 2. A provision level Q induces the following level of expected welfare,
Proof of Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that preferences of individuals are given in the reduced form
Incentive compatibility of an efficient provision rule holds provided that, for all m ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, and all w ∈ W ,
For N sufficiently large, there exists m such that Q * N (m + 1) < Q LH , where Q LH is the preferred quantity of an individual with θ i = θ L and
w . To see this, note that there is p ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that Q * (p ′ ) = Q LH , i.e. there is a state p ′ such that the modified Samuelson Rule requires to provide the preferred quantity of individuals with θ i = θ L and w i = w H . Consequently, m+2 N +2 close to zero implies that Q * N (m + 1) < Q LH . Since, the function
Hence, a contradiction to incentive compatibility. Analogously, one can show that for m N +2 close to 1 the incentive compatibility constraint for individuals with θ i = θ H and
Adding these inequalities implies that
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Q N be an efficient provision rule for a sample of size N . The induced level of expected welfare is given by
This term is known as the Riemann sum for the function (pθ
) and thus converges to EW * for growing N .
Proof of Proposition 3. "⇐=": Suppose provision rule Q N satisfies i), ii) and iii). Define a voting mechanism Q V N such that for every z ∈ {0, . . . , N }, Q N (z) = Q V N (z). Consider the strategy σ with σ(θ, w) = yes, whenever (θ, w) ∈ X, and σ(θ, w) = no, otherwise. We first show that σ is an equilibrium in dominant strategies for the game induced by Q V N . Suppose otherwise, then there is m y and (θ, w) such that σ(θ, w) = no and
. But this implies that there is m X and (θ, w) such that (θ, w) ∈ −X and U (Q N (m X ), θ, w) < U (Q N (m X − 1), θ, w) or (θ, w) ∈ X and U (Q N (m X ), θ, w) < U (Q N (m X + 1), θ, w). Hence, a contradiction to the assumption that iii) holds. It remains to show that Q N ((θ i , w i ) i∈S N ) = Q V N (m σ y ((θ i , w i ) i∈S N )), for every (θ i , w i ) i∈S N . This follows from the fact that Q N can be viewed a function of m X and that for every m X , m X = m σ y ((θ i , w i ) i∈S N ). "=⇒": Suppose provision rule Q N is implementable by a voting mechanism Q V N with dominant strategy σ. We first show that σ(θ, w) = no and σ(θ ′ , w ′ ) = yes implies that θw ≤ θ ′ w ′ , for any pair (θ, w) and (θ ′ , w ′ ). Suppose to the contrary that θw > θ ′ w ′ , then there exists m y such that
Adding these constraints implies that
or, since Q V N is a non-decreasing function, θ ′ w ′ ≥ θw. Hence a contradiction. Define the set X ′ = {(θ, w) ∈ Θ × W | σ(θ, w) = yes}. We show that Q N satisfies i) and ii) for X ′ . Consider two samples S N and
We finally show that iii) holds. Suppose otherwise, then there exists m X and (θ, w) such that (θ, w) ∈ −X ′ and
, for all z ∈ {0, . . . , N }. Hence, there is m y and (θ, w) such that σ(θ, w) = no and U (Q V N (m y ), θ, w) < U (Q V N (m y − 1), θ, w) or σ(θ, w) = yes and U (Q V N (m y ), θ, w) < U (Q V N (m y + 1), θ, w). But this contradicts the assumption that σ is a dominant strategy.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof consists of two parts. In part A, we show that the statement is true for the case of X = {(θ H , w L ), (θ H , w H )}. In part B, we demonstrate that the same arguments also apply to the case of X = {(θ H , w H )} (and analogously
Step 1. Using the computations in the proof of Lemma 2, we derive
Step 2. We now show that EW * * N,X ≤ EW * * X for any N ∈ N. To establish this claim, we consider, for any given N ∈ N, the following piecewise constant functionQ * * N,X :
The welfare level induced byQ * * N,X is denoted EW * * N,X . By definition,Q * * N,X is monotonically increasing in p and meets the constraints (5) and (6) since Q * * N,X meets (3) and (4). Hence, by the optimality of Q * * X among the provision rules satisfying (5) and (6), EW * * N,X ≤ EW * * X . It thus suffices to show that EW * * N,X ≤ EW * * N,X . In order to compute EW * * N,X , we first collect a number of observations which are easily verified by the reader.
2. For all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N } we have
Using these equalities and step 1, we calculate
It remains to show that
if N is even and
if N is odd. However, as Q * * N,X is increasing, those sums are non-negative.
Step 3. We now establish that EW * * N,X converges to EW * * X as N → ∞. To this end, for any N ∈ N, consider the restriction Q * * X|N of Q * * X to the domain {0, 1, . . . , N }.
X|N is monotonically increasing in m X for any N ∈ N and meets the constraints (3) and (4) as Q * * X satisfies (5) and (6). Denote by EW * * X|N the expected welfare level induced by Q * * X|N . Noting that Q * * N,X is optimal among the provision rules satisfying (3) and (4) and using step 2, we then have EW * * X|N ≤ EW * * N,X ≤ EW * * X for any N ∈ N. Thus it suffices to show that lim N →∞ EW * * X|N = EW * * X . To see this, we calculate
The first term is the Riemann sum for v(p)Q * * X (p) − K(Q * * X (p)) and thus converges to EW * * X for growing N . The absolute value of the second term in the sum is bounded from above by the expression
We show that for large N , the objective function for a voting mechanism with X = {(θ H , w H )} has the same mathematical structure as a voting mechanism with X = {(θ H , w L ), (θ H , w H )}. This implies that the same arguments can be used to establish convergence. Let Q N,X : m X → Q N,X (m X ) be an admissible provision rule for a voting mechanism with X = {(θ H , w H )}. Using similar computations as in the proof of Lemma 2, we derive the induced level of expected welfare
18 An analogous argument can be made for X = {(θL, wH ), (θH , wL), (θH , wH )}.
The sum in the second line can without loss of generality be assumed to be bounded because it will never be optimal to choose an infinitely large provision level of the public good; hence the term in the second line vanishes as N → ∞. The random variable 1 η m X +1 N +2 is a consistent estimator for the unknown value of p ∈ [0, 1]. 19 The random variable
} is also a consistent estimator of p. Moreover, the probability distributions of both random variables converge to a uniform density as N → ∞. 20 As a consequence, for large N , choosing
Given the latter optimization problem we can apply the arguments from part A again to establish convergence.
19 To see this note that -given any sample realization where mX individuals have characteristics in X -the maximum likelihood estimatorpML of p satisfieŝ
The maximum likelihood estimator is known to be be consistent. This implies that
is also consistent. 20 We demonstrate this for 
B Appendix B.1 A taxonomy of possible solutions
Lemma 6 Consider voting mechanisms where the set of individuals who vote yes is given by X = {(θ H , w L ), (θ H , w H )}. An optimal provision rule belongs to one of the following categories: i) Provision rules that are constant over four "bunching regions" and that are increasing for medium levels of p. For such a provision rule there exist numbers Q ss , Q s , Q l and Q ll such that
and the critical indices are implicitly defined by the following equations:
ii) Provision rules that are constant over three "bunching regions". For such a provision rule there exist numbers Q s , Q m and Q l such that
and the critical indicesp andp are defined implicitly by the equations
iii) that are constant over two "bunching regions". For such a provision rule there exist numbers Q s and Q l such that
where the critical indexp is defined implicitly by the equation
Proof Claim 1. Denote by V Q the image of a provision rule Q : p → Q(p), i.e. x ∈ V Q if and only if there exists p ∈ [0, 1] with Q(p) = x. Suppose Q solves the problem of maximizing EW subject to the following informative voting (IV ) constraints: for every pair p and
Then there exists at most one element x ∈ V Q with x < Q LH and at most one element z ∈ V Q with z > Q HL . Proof of Claim 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist x, y ∈ V Q with x < y < Q LH . This implies that there exist p and p ′ > p, with Q(p) < Q(p ′ ) < Q LH . Since preferences are single-peaked,
a contradiction to the IV constraints. Analogously one shows that the image of an admissible provision rule contains at most one element z with z > Q HL . Claim 2. A provision rule Q for which there exists y ∈ V Q with y ∈ [Q LH , Q HL ] is a candidate for a solution only if there exist x, z ∈ V Q with x < Q LH and Q HL < z. Proof of Claim 2. We first argue that a provision rule Q for which there exist neither x ∈ V Q with x < Q LH nor z ∈ V Q with z > Q HL cannot be optimal. To be optimal, such a hypothetical provision rule would have to be the degenerate case of a provision rule with four pooling levels, which results as the limit outcome as Q ss converges to Q LH and Q l converges to Q HL . Under a provision rule characterized by four pooling levels, expected welfare EW satisfies the following equation:
where Q s andp ′ are implicit functions of Q ss . Similarly, Q l andp ′ are implicit functions of Q ll . Taking these functional relationships into account, one may compute the partial derivatives and verify that Thus, Q ss = Q LH and Q ll = Q HL cannot be optimal. We now argue in a similar manner that it cannot be optimal to choose a provision rule with y, z ∈ V Q satisfying Q LH < y < Q HL < z, but without x ∈ V Q satisfying x < Q LH : Definez < Q HL by the equation θ H w L z − K(z) = θ H w Lz − K(z). Note that for such a provision rule to be a optimal under it has to be true that y ≤z and that V Q = [Q LH ,z] ∪ {z} by Claim 1. Again, this is a degenerate case of a provision rule with four pooling levels, namely the one that results as Q ss converges to Q LH and Q ll = z. As above, this hypothetical solution can be ruled out as lim Qss→Q LH ∂EW (Qss, Q ll ) ∂Qss < 0 .
The analogous argument allows us to rule out a provision rule with x, y ∈ V Q and x < Q LH < y < Q HL but without z ∈ V Q satisfying z > Q HL . These arguments imply that an optimal provision rule has to be one with two, three or four bunching regions.
Lemma 7 Consider voting mechanisms where the set of individuals who vote yes is given by X = {(θ H , w H )}. An optimal provision rule belongs to one of the following categories:
i) Provision rules that are constant over two bunching regions and that are increasing for high levels of p. For such a provision rule there exist numbers Q s and Q l such that ii) Provision rules with two bunching regions.
Proof The proof uses similar arguments as the proof of Lemma 6. Hence, the arguments are only sketched. Suppose Q solves the problem of maximizing EW subject to the following informative voting (IV ) constraints: for every pair p and p ′ with p ′ > p, (θ, w) ∈ {(θ H , w H )} implies that U (Q(p ′ ), θ, w) ≥ U (Q(p), θ, w), and (θ, w) ∈ {(θ H , w L ), (θ L , w L ), (θ L , w H )} implies that U (Q(p), θ, w) ≥ U (Q(p ′ ), θ, w). Claim. If θ L w H < θ H w L , then there is exactly one element x ∈ V Q with x < Q LH . If θ H w L ≤ θ L w H < θ H w L , then there is exactly is at most one element x ∈ V Q with x < Q HL . Proof. Because preferences are single-peaked there can be at most one x ∈ V Q with x < Q LH (x < Q HL ) if θ L w H < θ H w L (θ H w L ≤ θ L w H ). It follows from the same argument as in Claim 3 in the proof of Lemma 6 that it cannot be optimal to have no x ∈ V Q with x < Q LH (x < Q HL ) if θ L w H < θ H w L (θ H w L ≤ θ L w H ). This implies that an optimal provision rule under IV constraints, which is not constant, is constant over two bunching regions. Depending on the parameters it may be optimal to choose the larger bunching point Q l such that Q l < Q * (1). In this case there is a range of large values of p, where the optimal provision rule coincides with the Samuelson Rule Q * . These are the levels of p for which Q * (p) ≥ Q l .
The analysis of a voting mechanism where only individuals with characteristics given by (θ L , w L ) vote no is the mirror image of the case where only individuals with (θ H , w H ) vote yes. The proof uses the same arguments as the proof of Lemma 7 and is omitted.
Lemma 8 Consider voting mechanisms where the set of individuals who vote yes is given by X = {(θ H , w L ), (θ L , w H ), (θ H , w H )}. An optimal provision rule belongs to one of the following categories: i) Provision rules that are constant over two bunching regions and that are increasing interval for small levels of p. For such a provision rule there exist numbers Q s and Q l such that ii) Provision rules with two bunching intervals.
B.2 Results of the comparative statics exercise
Our numerical comparative statics exercise is based on the following assumptions.
Assumption 2 Let θ L = 1, and θ H = 2. Suppose that K(Q) = 1 2 Q 2 . Let w L = 1 − x and w H = 1 + x. For any x, let λ = 1.
The assumptions θ L = 1 and θ H = 2 are normalizations. Assuming a quadratic cost function is a simplification that implies that the optimal provision level from the perspective of an individual with characteristics (θ, w) equals θw and that this individual prefers a provision level Q ′ over Q ′′ if and only if | θw − Q ′ | ≤ | θw − Q ′′ |. x is our measure of skill heterogeneity. We let x vary between 0 and 1 and assume that the shadow cost of public funds λ remains constant. Hence, as we vary x, we are also adjusting the share of high-skilled individuals in the population, η, so that λ remains unaffected. Holding λ fixed at 1 implies that the modified Samuelson Rule Q * is given by Q * (p) = 1 + p, so that our first best benchmark remains constant. Put differently,
